Which Term Refers To The Drawing Of Political Boundaries

Equal population

The U.South. Constitution requires that each district have most the aforementioned population: each federal district within a state must take almost the same number of people, each country district within a state must have well-nigh the same number of people, and each local district within its jurisdiction must have almost the same number of people.

• Congressional districts. The standard for congressional districts allows relatively modest deviations, when deployed in the service of legitimate objectives.  States must brand a good-faith effort to draw districts with the same number of people in each commune inside the state, and any district with more than or fewer people than the average must exist justified by a consistent land policy.  But consistent policies that leave a relatively small spread from largest to smallest district will likely be constitutional.  In 2022, for example, the Supreme Court canonical a congressional program in Due west Virginia with 0.79% population variation based on keeping county lines intact.

These population counts are calculated based on the total number of people in each state, including children, noncitizens, and others not eligible to vote.  Subsequently the Ceremonious War, nosotros amended the Constitution to ensure that each and every individual present in the land would be represented in federal districts.  On July 21, 2022, President Trump purported to suggest that he had the authority to exclude undocumented individuals from the census count — if valid, that would accept afflicted non only how many districts usa got, just how those districts were divided inside a state.  Litigation over the effect hit procedural hurdles as information technology was unclear whether the data would exist ready in fourth dimension for President Trump to brand the determination he'd flagged; ultimately, the data were delayed long plenty for the Biden Administration to reverse course.  As in prior decades, the Demography counts will include anybody for purposes of circulation.

• State and local legislative districts have a bit more than flexibility on the numbers; they have to exist "substantially" equal. Over a series of cases, it has get accepted that a plan will be constitutionally suspect if the largest and smallest districts are more than ten percent apart. This is not a hard line: a state program may be upheld if there is a compelling reason for a larger disparity, and a state programme may be struck downwardly if a smaller disparity is not justified by a good reason.

Some states agree their land districts to stricter population equality limits than the federal constitution requires. Colorado, for example, allows at near five percentage full deviation between the largest and smallest districts; Missouri asks districts to be no more than one pct above or below the average, except that deviations of upwards to 3 percentage are permitted to maintain political boundaries. Iowa both limits the full population deviation to five percent, and too sets the overall average deviation at no more than than one percent.

As far aswho is counted for purpose of equalizing state and local districts, the Supreme Court has been less definitive about what the Constitution requires. In 2022, each and every state counted the full population.  But some accept suggested other measures, including voting-age population ("VAP"), denizen voting-age population ("CVAP"), or registered voters. Each of these alternatives depends on a logic of exclusion, denying representation to those who pay taxes and who are expected to live by our laws.  Though the Supreme Courtroom has formally left this question for a time to come case, their concluding give-and-take in the expanse left serious question equally to whether such measures would be ramble.

Minority representation

The other gear up of major federal redistricting rules concerns race and ethnicity.  The extent to which redistricting can or must account for race and ethnicity is sometimes seen every bit a specially thorny problem, only that'due south in part considering some people have a vested interest in making it seem difficult.  Race relations and electoral politics are both quite complicated.  But the police on race and ethnicity in the redistricting context essentially boils downwardly to iii concepts.  And while there are without question some complications in the details — including some hurdles for challengers trying to challenge maps in court — the overview for those drawing the lines is pretty straightforward.

1. Don't draw lines that set out to harm voters based on their race or ethnicity.
2. Where discrimination plays or has played a significant role, and where voting is substantially polarized along racial or ethnic lines, wait at balloter patterns and decide whether minorities already have proportionate balloter power. If non, the Voting Rights Human action might require a modify to the lines to requite a compact and sizable minority community equitable electoral opportunity they practice not currently bask.
3. When considering race in drawing districts, whether to satisfy the Voting Rights Act or otherwise, consider other factors in the mix too.

• Intentional discrimination. For more than 100 years, the Constitution has prohibited intentional government efforts to treat similarly situated people worse than others, because of their race or ethnicity.  In redistricting, i ploy is called "cracking": splintering minority populations into modest pieces beyond several districts, so that a big group ends up with a very little hazard to impact whatsoever single election. Another tactic is called "packing": pushing as many minority voters equally possible into a few super-concentrated districts, and draining the population's voting power from anywhere else. Other tactics abound.  And they have been used with disappointing frequency.Redistricting legislation usually just describes which census blocks autumn in which districts, or which streets district lines follow: nil in a redistricting statute looks similar it has anything to do with race.  But if the line-drawers intentionally drew the lines to harm residents specifically because of their race, that's virtually e'er illegal.
  
  That remains true no matter the underlying motive for the discrimination.  Sometimes, the reason for intentional discrimination is old-fashioned hatred or stereotype.  Merely singling out racial minorities for worse handling considering of the candidates or parties they prefer however involves singling out racial minorities for worse handling.  And it nevertheless invites particularly close scrutiny under the constitution.

• Voting Rights Act.  The federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 was designed to combat tactics denying minorities the right to an constructive vote, including redistricting techniques like those above. As federal law, the Voting Rights Human action overrides inconsistent state laws, but similar the ramble equal population rule overrides other state laws.From 1965-2013, the Voting Rights Deed had an especially powerful provision targeting the jurisdictions with the worst history of bigotry.  In these areas, the Voting Rights Act required every change in election rules to exist run by the Department of Justice or a federal court before they took upshot, stopping discrimination earlier it had the chance to work.  In 2006, Congress last revisited the role of the statute designating which jurisdictions should be covered.  Only in 2022, the Supreme Court decided in Shelby County 5. Holder that this 2006 renewal was not sufficiently tied to current conditions; their conclusion hit down the coerage provision essentially left no jurisdictions covered.  In 2022, the Firm of Representatives passed a new coverage provision, but it did not keep through the Senate.After Shelby Canton, the most powerful remaining provision of the Voting Rights Act is Department 2 of the Deed, which blocks district lines that deny minority voters an equal opportunity "to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their selection." It applies whether the denial is intentional, or an unintended end outcome. Courts essentially test whether the way that districts are drawn takes decisive political power away from a cohesive minority bloc otherwise at risk for bigotry.

  There are 3 threshold conditions for a court finding that districts need to be redrawn because section two has been violated. (These are often called Gingles conditions, after the Supreme court'sThornburg v. Gingles instance.)

  The first asks whether it is possible to depict a district so that a majority of voters belong to a geographically "compact" racial, ethnic, or language minority community. Compactness has never been precisely defined in this context, but by and large refers to populations that are not especially "far-flung," and where the boundaries are fairly regular, without extensive tendrils. This firstGingles status basically tests whether a sufficiently large minority population is geographically distributed so that they could control a reasonable district.

  The secondGingles condition tests whether the minority population normally votes as a bloc, for the same type of candidate. This is a nuanced test: not whether the community usually votes for Democrats or Republicans (or others), but whether they would, given a fair mix of candidates, vote for the aforementionedtype of Democrats or Republicans (or others).

  The thirdGingles condition tests the potential competition: whether the rest of the population in the surface area usually votes equally a bloc for different candidates than those preferred by the minority community. If so, this would mean that the minority's preferred candidate would almost e'er lose — if the minority community'southward voting ability were not specifically protected. Together, the second and third atmospheric condition are known by and large as "racially polarized" voting.

  If the three threshold weather condition in a higher place have been met, courts then look to the "totality of the circumstances" to make up one's mind whether the minority vote has been diluted, cartoon from the U.S. Senate's legislative study when the Voting Rights Act was passed. Most of these circumstances chronicle to the extent of historical or contextual discrimination. One cistron that has been singled out as particularly important is rough proportionality: whether minorities have the opportunity to elect representatives of their option in a number of districts roughly proportional to the pct of minority voters in the population every bit a whole. Section two does not guarantee proportionality. But if a minority group with xx% of a state's eligible population could already elect representatives in 20% of the country's districts, courts will be more hesitant to find a violation of section ii even if the threeGingles weather condition are met. And if the minority group does not take such an opportunity, courts will ofttimes be more prone to detect a violation.Courts have largely articulated Section two'southward significant afterwards plans have been fatigued and challenged, and so the tests to a higher place are framed retroactively. For those drawing the lines and seeking to avert legal trouble, the usual technique involves protecting substantial minority populations in racially polarized areas, past drawing district lines then that those minorities take the functional opportunity to elect a representative of their choice.

• Considering other factors. The Supreme Court has also said that the Constitution requires it to look skeptically at redistricting plans when race or ethnicity is the "predominant" reason for putting a significant number of people in or out of a commune.  This does non mean that race can't exist considered, or that when districts drawn primarily based on race are invalid.  It means that at that place has to be a really skilful reason for subordinating all other districting considerations to race. (And the Court has also repeatedly implied that one such compelling reason is compliance with the federal Voting Rights Human action.)In do, this ways that those cartoon the lines try non to let racial considerations "predominate," by considering other factors at the aforementioned time.  This is not terribly hard; at that place are lots of other considerations that become into deciding where to draw a detail district line, like the residential clustering of groups of voters with common interests, or the locations of municipal boundaries or physical geographic features, or the desire to go on a district relatively close together.It may exist useful to recall of this dominion like nearly of us think near driving a car.  It's important to keep to the speed limit.  If you lot captivate over your speed, and stare but at the speedometer, subordinating every other stimulus, you're likely to crash.  Only if you pay attention to the road, and surrounding traffic, and the directions to your destination, and signaling when you change lanes, and the car temperature, and the amount of gas you've got left, and the weather, and the music on the radio — and also bank check in on your speed from time to time — then your attention to the speed doesn't "predominate."

Contiguity

Contiguity is the well-nigh mutual rule imposed by u.s.a.: by state constitution or statute, 45 states require at least i bedchamber's land legislative districts to be contiguous. 18 states take similarly alleged that their congressional districts volition be contiguous. (The smaller number reflects the fact that few states take any limited legal constraints on congressional districting. In practice, the vast majority of congressional districts — perhaps every one in the 2022 cycle — will exist drawn to be contiguous.)

A district is contiguous if you can travel from any point in the district to any other signal in the district without crossing the district'due south purlieus. Put differently, all portions of the district are physically adjacent. Most states require portions of a commune to be continued by more than a single bespeak, but don't farther require that a commune be connected past territory of a certain area.

Few redistricting concepts are absolute, and contiguity is no exception. Many states require contiguity merely "to the extent possible," and courts generally accept anomalies that otherwise seem reasonable in context. For instance, the city of Racine, Wisconsin, has a non-face-to-face boundary (boundaries like this are fairly common by-products of annexation). And and so, in 2001, the legislature drew Wisconsin's 61st land assembly district to incorporate nearly of the city of Racine — with a noncontiguous portion of the commune embracing the noncontiguous portion of the city.  In 2022, Wisconsin's 47th state associates district did much the aforementioned for the noncontiguous portions of Blooming Grove and several other noncontiguous wards, and the 60th state assembly district did the aforementioned for the noncontiguous portions of Cedarburg.

Water also gets special treatment for contiguity. In about cases, districts divided by water are contiguous if a common means of transport (similar a span or ferry route) connects the 2 sides of the district. Island districts are generally contiguous every bit long every bit the island is part of the same district as the mainland expanse closest to the island or most tied to the island past these sorts of transport routes. In Hawaii, where there is no mainland to consider, the state constitution prohibits the drawing of "canoe districts" — districts that are spread beyond more than 1 major isle group, where it is necessary to utilise a "canoe" to travel between dissimilar parts of the district.

Political boundaries

The side by side about common state rule is a requirement to follow political boundaries, like county, urban center, town, or ward lines, when cartoon districts. By state constitution or statute, 34 states require state legislative districts to show some bookkeeping for political boundaries; xv states impose like constraints on congressional districts. Most often, state constabulary apropos political boundaries leaves a fair amount of flexibility in the mandate — i common instruction is to proceed to political boundaries "to the extent practicable." And similar all other state redistricting police force, this rule must bend where necessary to federal equal population or Voting Rights Human activity constraints.

It is worth remembering that some cities or towns spill over county lines; even though counties are usually bigger than cities, keeping strictly to county lines may mean cutting off pieces of these "spillover" cities or metropolitan areas.

Also, if counties or cities take to be split up to comply with other redistricting requirements, most state law does not specify whether it is better to minimize the number of jurisdictions that are split up, or to minimize the number of times that a given jurisdiction is carve up. The one-time might hateful splitting a few jurisdictions into many pieces; the latter might mean splitting a greater number of jurisdictions, just into fewer pieces.  (As an exception to the general flexibility, Ohio has a rather detailed set of constraints describing how counties and other municipalities are to exist split if they have to be divide at all.)

Firmness

Almost equally often equally state constabulary asks districts to follow political boundaries, it asks that districts be "compact."  Past constitution or statute, 32 states crave their legislative districts to exist reasonably compact; 17 states require congressional districts to exist compact as well.

Few states define precisely what "compactness" means, merely a district in which people more often than not live well-nigh each other is commonly more meaty than one in which they do non. Almost observers look to measures of a commune's geometric shape. In California, districts are meaty when they practice not bypass nearby population for people further abroad. In the Voting Rights Act context, the Supreme Court seems to have construed firmness to indicate that residents have some sort of cultural cohesion in common.

Scholars accept proposed more than 30 measures of compactness, each of which tin can be applied in unlike ways to individual districts or to a plan as a whole. These generally fit into three categories. In the get-go category,contorted boundaries are virtually important: a district with smoother boundaries will exist more than meaty, and 1 with more than squiggly boundaries will exist less meaty. In the second category, the degree to which the district spreads from a fundamental core (chosen "dispersion") is virtually important: a district with few pieces sticking out from the centre will be more compact, and one with pieces sticking out further from the district's center will be less compact. In the third category, the relationship ofhousing patterns to the district's boundaries is most of import: district tendrils, for example, are less meaningful in sparsely populated areas but more meaningful where the population is densely packed.

In practice, compactness tends to be in the eye of the beholder. Idaho, for instance, says that its redistricting committee "should avoid cartoon districts that are oddly shaped" — which is more than specific than almost states. Only 7 states appear to specify a item measure of compactness: Arizona and Colorado focus on contorted boundaries; California, Michigan, Missouri, and Montana focus on dispersion, though in different ways; and Iowa embraces both.

Communities of interest

Preserving "communities of involvement" is another common criterion reflected in state police.  By constitution or statute, 15 states consider keeping "communities of interest" whole when drawing state legislative districts; 11 states do the same for congressional districts.

A "community of involvement" is just a group of people with a common involvement (usually, a common interest that legislation might do good). Kansas' 2002 guidelines offered a fairly typical definition: "[s]ocial, cultural, racial, ethnic, and economic interests common to the population of the area, which are likely subjects of legislation."

Several of the other principles above may exist seen as proxies for recognizing rough communities of interest. For example, a requirement to follow county boundaries may be based on an assumption that citizens within a county share some common interests relevant to legislative representation. Similarly, a compactness requirement may be based on a similar supposition that people who live close to each other have shared legislative ends. Only each of these proxies may also be imperfect: people with common interests don't generally look to geometric shapes — or even strict political lines — when they consider where they want to alive. Because communities of interest directly is a style to stride by the proxy.

Partisan outcomes

Most scholarly and popular attention to redistricting has to practise with the partisan upshot of the process, though partisan impacts are hardly the only salient impacts.

The federal constitution puts few applied limits on redistricting bodies. Individual districts can be drawn to favor or aversion candidates of a certain party, or individual incumbents or challengers (indeed, the Court has explicitly blessed lines drawn to protect incumbents, and even those drawn for a petty bit of partisan advantage).  As for the district plan equally a whole, the Supreme Courtroom has unanimously stated that excessive partisanship in the process is unconstitutional, but the Court has also said that federal courts cannot hear claims of undue partisanship considering of an inability to make up one's mind how much is "too much."

Country law, yet, increasingly restricts undue partisanship.  In 2022, simply 8 states directly regulated partisan outcomes in the redistricting procedure (as opposed to attempting to accomplish compromise or balance through the structure of the redistricting trunk); now, the constitutions or statutes of 19 states speak to the issue for state legislative districts, and 17 states do the aforementioned for congressional districts.

Most of these country-law provisions prohibit "unduly" favoring (or disfavoring) a candidate or political party, which might include both intent and result; some, like Florida, specify that the intent to favor or disfavor is impermissible.  Ohio'due south police force specifies that the state legislative plan, equally a whole, may non be drawn "primarily" to favor or disfavor a political party, and separately specifies that the plan'south overal partisan district alignment should "correspond closely" to statewide partisan preferences.  And both Rhode Island and Washington provisions speak in terms of fair and effective representation, but without much construction past state courts to give further meaning.

Arizona, Colorado, and Washington are the only states that affirmatively encourage districts that are competitive in a general election, in slightly different ways; in each case, this is a goal to be implemented simply when doing so would not backbite from other state priorities.  New York prohibits discouraging contest, which is slightly different.  And Missouri purports to found a structure for both rough partisan disinterestedness and contest, though its item implementation of the terms amounts to negligible constraint in exercise.

Arizona, California, Iowa, and Idaho ban because an incumbent'due south dwelling accost when drawing district lines; many of the same states likewise limit the use of further political data like partisan registration or voting history. Note: where minority populations nowadays the possibility of obligations under the Voting Rights Act, those drawing the lines may have to consider partisan voter history to assess racial polarization, no affair what land law provides. Also, it is important to call up that every determination to draw district lines in 1 place or another has a political effect; lines drawn without looking at underlying voting data can be simply every bit politically skewed every bit lines drawn with the data in mind.

Other state rules

At that place are three other notable structural rules that, in some states, govern the location of commune lines.

• The get-go is a "nesting" requirement. In states where districts are "nested," the districts of the country Senate are synthetic by combining ii or 3 state House or Assembly districts (or the districts of the state House or Assembly are constructed by dividing up each land Senate district). In contrast, without nesting, the districts of each legislative house are independent; they may follow the same boundary lines, only they don't have to. In xviii states, country police asks that the lower and upper legislative business firm districts be nested where possible; of these states, in California, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Utah, the law amounts to rough preference rather than mandate.
• The second rule concerns districts where 2, 3, or more than representatives are elected from the aforementioned district; these are called "multi-member" districts. Since 1842, federal police has prohibited multi-member districts for Congress, but many local legislatures still elect several representatives from a single district. In the state legislature, Arizona, New Jersey, South Dakota, and Washington elect all lower business firm members from multi-member districts; 9 other states expressly authorize the apply of one or more multi-member districts. In some instances, multi-member districts may be used together with nesting rules; in Arizona, for example, each district elects ane state senator and two state representatives. In other cases (like W Virginia), multi-member districts for one legislative chamber are not tied to the districts of the other bedchamber: a Senate district and a multi-member Assembly district are entirely unrelated. Multi-member districts in which each representative is elected by majority vote may raise concerns under the Voting Rights Human action, though such concerns can be alleviated through some alternative voting rules.
• The tertiary rule of note is the "floterial" district: a commune that wholly or partially overlaps other districts in the same legislative chamber. Florida, Mississippi, and New Hampshire expressly allow floterial districts. Most floterial districts arose every bit a manner to preserve political boundaries while also limiting astringent population disparities. Imagine a state where the average district's population is 100, just at that place are 2 adjacent towns with 150 people each. Ane way to ensure equal population is to separate upwards the towns and so that there are three mutually exclusive districts with 100 people each. An culling is to create 1 commune serving each town, and one "floterial district" elected by the 300 people in both towns together, and so that the 300 people have the aforementioned 3 total representatives.

Source: https://redistricting.lls.edu/redistricting-101/where-are-the-lines-drawn/

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